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1.   
There is a way of thinking about law that contemporary normative theorists on 
criminalization and legal punishment are particularly anxious about, and that way is to conceive law 
as involving legal coercion in the manner of threats. This way of conceiving law is unsurprising, 
especially when we look at criminal law; it prescribes requirements of conduct (e.g. do not murder) 
for which we are liable to be punished when we fail to conform to them (e.g. life imprisonment). It 
then seems they are just like coercive threats: do not murder, or else you will be imprisoned for life. 
Indeed, conceiving criminal law in this way is best suggested by a deterrence-based justification of 
punishment, where the justifiability of punishment lies mainly in its ability to deter people from 
committing crimes.
1
 Under this picture, punishment is then seen as a kind of threat, which seeks to 
deter people from violating the requirements of conduct that are prescribed by the criminal law.
2
 
Independent from the issue of whether conceiving law in this way actually corresponds to 
law as we find it in the real world,
3
 what makes legal coercion morally problematic to normative 
theorists is that it is susceptible to the Hegelian objection: it treats “a man like a dog instead of with 
the freedom and respect due to him as a man” (Hegel 2001: §99 Addition). But in what sense does 
legal coercion fail to respect individuals in a way that is “due to him as a man”? And what are the 
grounds for this requirement to respect? 
 This paper is an attempt to answer these questions. I shall argue that legal coercion fails to 
respect individuals as reason-responsive agents, and that individuals ought to be respected as such 
in virtue of the fact that they are human beings. It is in this sense that I contend legal coercion fails 
to treat individuals with the kind of “respect due to him as a man”.4 But first, let me explain what I 
mean by legal coercion, as it is targeted by the Hegelian objection. 
 
2.  
According to the Hegelian objection, legal coercion is objectionable because it treats people 
like dogs, rather than with the respect that is owed to them as ‘man’. But the objection here is not 
merely that since the laws in question are unjustified, threatening people with punishment fails to 
respect them. Rather, it is that even if the laws in question are justified, they still fail to respect 
                                                     
1
 It is only ‘mainly’, because the justifiability of punishment also depends on other considerations; for example, the 
proportionality of punishment and only punishing those who are guilty. 
2
 This is not confined only to those who hold a consequentialist justification of punishment. Even retributivists have 
reasons to conceive criminal law in this way, insofar as they think that the deterrence effect of the punishment that 
offenders deserve also constitutes an additional reason to impose the punishment in question, alongside the familiar 
retributivist reason that offenders deserve it. For such a retributivist position, see e.g. Tasioulas (2006: 285 & 302-
305). 
3
 And whether it involves coercion of other kinds as well; see Edmundson (1995), Lamond (2000) & Yankah (2008). 
4
 Of course, there are other ways to flesh out the Hegelian objection; for example, in terms of the Kantian slogan of 
never treating people merely as means but always as ends. However, it is notoriously hard to pin down what this 
Kantian slogan exactly amounts to in a way that is satisfactory. See e.g. Duff (2001: 13). Note that Hegel does not 
therefore find all legal punishments unjustifiable because of this objection. Rather, he thinks that they are justifiable 
as ‘annulling’ criminal wrongdoings. See e.g. Kleinig (1991: 415-416). 
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people by threatening them with punishment. The alluded imagery here is that by threatening 
someone with punishment for, say for the example, the justifiable end of not attacking others, we 
are treating him in a way that might very well be less cruel, but nevertheless not all that different 
from, when we threaten to beat a dog with a stick to stop it from attacking others. But what exactly 
does legal coercion amounts to when the laws in question are justified? 
Assuming that they are justified; what the law threatens us to do or not to do, if and when it 
does threaten us at all, are things that we already have good (if not sometimes fully justified) 
reasons, independently from the threat itself, for or against doing anyway. Sometimes these 
independent reasons are pre-legal and moral in nature. This is the case for mala in se crimes. Quite 
apart from the threat of punishment, we already have good independent reasons against murdering, 
raping or stealing from others. Sometimes they are based on authority, as it is the case for mala 
prohibita crimes. If the law is justified in requiring us to pay 20% of our income as taxes, or to 
drive on the left, then this constitutes, independent from the threat of punishment, an (authority-
based) reason for us to do so. Note that none of this implies that we have a general obligation to 
obey the law just because it is the law. Rather, the claim here is that if the laws in question are 
justified, then we already have a reason to do or not to do that which the law requires or prohibits. 
This reason might be a pre-legal moral one, or it might be authority-based, or may sometimes even 
be both; but it is a reason that is independent from the threat of punishment itself. 
Understood in this way, legal coercion is therefore different from the coercive threats in 
gunman scenarios (see also Hart 1994: 19 & 79-85). The things that a gunman threatens one to do 
(or not to do), are normally things that one already has independent reasons against doing (or for 
doing); as in when he threatens one to shoot the guards in the bank or when he threatens one not to 
alert the police. Indeed, sometimes it might very well be things that one does not have any reasons, 
independent from the threat, to do or not to do, as in when he threatens one to lie down on the floor 
and not to make a noise. 
Of course, it is possible to have a gunman who threatens one to do (or not to do) something 
that one already has independent reasons for doing (or against doing), just like in legal coercion. A 
morally righteous gunman who threatens us to perform our duties of charity would be an example 
of this. However, the issue here is not to identify something distinctive about legal coercion, in 
order to distinguish it from the coercive threats in gunman scenarios. Rather, it is to identify and 
highlight an aspect of the kind of legal coercion that is targeted by the Hegelian objection. 
So, for the purposes of this paper, legal coercion involves threatening one to do (or not to 
do) something that one already has reasons, independent from the threat itself, to do (or not to do). 
But why does that fail to respect one in a way that is due to one as a ‘man’? After all, the law is 
merely threatening us for something that we in any case have good independent reasons for anyway. 
What is so morally problematic with that?
5
 
A small caveat before continuing: to say legal coercion fails to respect people and is 
therefore morally problematic, is not to say that it can never be justified. Rather, it is to say that it is 
at least a prima facie wrong, which requires other countervailing reasons (if there are any) before 
legal coercion can be justified. Thus even if legal coercion fails to respect people, it might 
nevertheless be justified all things considered. The arguments in the rest of this paper should 
therefore be seen as only accounting for the prima facie wrongfulness of legal coercion.   
 
3. 
                                                     
5
 This was also explored by Dan-Cohen (1994), although he framed it in terms of how law’s normative appeal is 
undermined by its use of coercion. 
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 One argument against legal coercion is this: As a kind of coercive threat, legal coercion fails 
to respect the kind of independence that is required for autonomous agency. Assuming that 
respecting people as autonomous agents is due to them as ‘men’ (see e.g. Kant 1996: §6 434-435), 
legal coercion also therefore fails to respect them in a way that is due to them as ‘men’. Of course, 
‘autonomy’ is a hugely complex notion which is used to mean a variety of things (Dworkin 1988: 5-
6; Feinberg 1989: Ch 18). But central to the concept of ‘autonomy’ is the idea that an autonomous 
agent is ‘self-governing’ or ‘self-determining’ in some sense or another (Dworkin 1988: 12-13). 
When this is applied more generally to the life of the agent in question, his desires, preferences, 
wishes, commitments etc., we are talking about ‘personal autonomy’; when it is applied more 
specifically to the moral principles of the agent in question, we are talking about ‘moral 
autonomy’.6 But insofar as we are talking about an agent as ‘self-governing’ or ‘self-determining’ 
in some sense or another, then this requires that the agent in question is independent from the 
external influences of others in some sense or another (Raz 1986: 148-157 & 377-378; Scanlon 
1972: 215-217; Dowrkin 1988: 21-33).
7
 It is of course very tricky to determine exactly the kinds of 
external influences that are excluded by this: for example, do the authoritative teachings of one’s 
elders, or the culture in which one is brought up, count as the relevant kinds of external influences 
(see also Dworkin 1988: 18)? Be that as it may, the thought here is that coercive threats seem to be 
the paradigmatic kinds of external influences that are excluded here; and inter alia legal coercion is 
something that autonomous agents should be independent from.     
 As one may already notice, much of this argument hinges on what is meant by the 
‘independence’ that is required for autonomous agency.  One might understand it merely as only 
requiring that the agent in question ‘makes up his own mind’, for example, on the matters at hand 
(Scanlon 1972: 215-216). However, if ‘independence’ is understood so thinly, then this threatens to 
undermine the above argument against legal coercion. Insofar as legal coercion involves coercive 
threats, rather than physical coercion, it is still up to the agent in question to ‘make up his own 
mind’ whether he should acquiesce to it, or defy it and risk suffering the threatened sanctions. As 
Scanlon points out, “A coercer merely changes the considerations which militate for or against a 
certain course of action; weighing these conflicting considerations is still up to you” (Scanlon 1972: 
216). 
 Scanlon might very well be too quick on this point. When we talk about coercive threats, we 
need to distinguish between those that operate in a more rational way, where it is plausible to say 
that it is still up to the agent himself to ‘weigh up the conflicting considerations’, from those threats 
that are so severe where this is not plausible anymore. Because of the severity of such latter kinds of 
threats, it seems more plausible to say that the agent is so terrified by them that this paralyses his 
will and compels his acquiesce. Thus not all coercive threats are where it is still up to the agents 
themselves to make up their own minds about. That said, none of this undermine the objection 
against understanding ‘independence’ thinly.  If, as we should, think of legal punishment in a 
humane way, which is just and proportionate to the crimes in question, then the kind of threats in 
legal coercion would most probably not strike us as so terrifying that they paralyze our wills. They 
would most probably be the former kind of threats, which operate in a more rational way, rather 
than the latter severe kind of threats. Thus legal coercion can still be compatible with the thin 
‘independence’ that is required for autonomous agency. 
                                                     
6
 But as Waldron (2005) argues, there is no reason to think that they are sharply distinct from each other. 
7
 To put it in Dworkin’s terms, the kind of ‘independence’ that I have in mind here is procedural independence rather 
than substantive independence 
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 What is therefore needed in the argument against legal coercion is not ‘independence’ 
merely as making up one’s own mind, but making up one’s own mind in a way that is free from 
coercive threats (Dworkin 1988: 18). However, as it currently stands here, this argument begs the 
question. What is needed here is why legal coercion is incompatible with the independence that is 
required for autonomous agency, not the assumption or stipulation that it is. We therefore need to 
ask the further question of why the ‘independence’ required for autonomy should be understood in 
this way that excludes coercive threats. 
 An attractive answer to the question is this: when we think about the ‘independence’ in 
autonomous agency, we are not just thinking of the agent as simply making up his mind for himself 
on what he should (or should not) do. Rather, we are thinking of the agent as deliberating in a way 
that is responsive to reasons; that is to say, he deliberates for himself what he should (or should not) 
do by appropriately responding to the reasons that bear on him.
8
 Of course, the reasons that bear on 
an agent are not just narrowly limited to reasons of prudence or self-interest; they also include, but 
are not necessarily exhausted by, the pre-legal moral reasons and authority-based reasons that I 
mentioned in the previous section, as long as they are indeed reasons that apply to him. Thus the 
agent I have in mind here is also responsive to the latter kinds of reasons as well, and not just to the 
former kinds of reasons. This, however, does not imply that such an agent conforms perfectly to all 
the reasons that apply to him, since he might very well be ignorant to some of these reasons. But the 
thought is that when these reasons are brought to his attention, then he is one who would deliberate 
in a way that is responsive to them. For the sake of brevity, I shall refer to the kind of agent that I 
have in mind here as a ‘reason-responsive agent’.  
It follows from all this that a reason-responsive agent must also have the requisite capacities 
to be responsive to reasons in the way described; but I take such requisite capacities as a necessary 
condition for being such an agent, rather than a sufficient condition. 
 Now, if reason-responsive agency is what we have in mind when thinking about the 
‘independence’ that is required for autonomous agency,9 then it becomes clear why legal coercion is 
incompatible with such ‘independence’. Recall that, as discussed in the previous section, legal 
coercion involves threatening one to do (or not to do) what the law justifiably requires (or 
prohibits), to which one already has reasons, independent from the threat itself, to do (or not to do). 
Given that is the case, it therefore seems that legal coercion subverts or undermines reason-
responsive agency, and hence the ‘independence’ required for autonomy. Rather than allowing 
individual agents to appropriately respond to the pre-legal moral or authority-based reasons that 
bear on them, and deliberate for themselves to do what the law justifiably requires;
10
 legal coercion 
seeks to bypass all this. Through the threat of punishments, it creates and appeals to prudential 
reasons bearing on individual agents, so that they would deliberate to do what the law justifiably 
requires by responding to these reasons, instead of those pre-legal or authority-based reasons. It is 
                                                     
8
 Mill, for example, seems to have something like this in mind when he says, “He who chooses his plan for himself 
employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgement to foresee…  It is not by wearing 
down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and call it forth, within the limits imposed 
by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation” (1974: 
123 & 127, my italics).  
9
 For the purposes of this paper, I am trying to avoid getting into the debate on how best to understand the nature of 
autonomous agency. But if I were to commit myself to one, then what I have discussed here suggests an externalist 
understanding of autonomous agency. For the distinction between this, and an internalist understanding, see e.g. 
Buss (2008). 
10
 For the sake of clarity and simplicity in the rest of this paper, I shall put aside the case of ‘what the law prohibits’. I 
do not think that my arguments will be affected by this.  
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in this sense that legal coercion fails to respect individuals in a way that is due to them as ‘men’, or 
so the argument goes.   
One might object that reason-responsive agency, as discussed above, implies that someone 
who has ‘weakness of will’ is not an agent in the relevant sense. I do think that is the case, at least 
he is not one at the moments when he succumbs to his ‘weakness of will’. However, at least for the 
purposes of this paper, nothing really hinges on whether someone who is weak-willed is a reason-
responsive agent or not. Even if he is not, it does not follow we are then not required to respect him 
in the same way as someone who indeed is a reason-responsive agent, as long as he has the requisite 
capacities to be one. This is because, as I shall argue later in section 5, this requirement of respect is 
not grounded on the fact that someone is a reason-responsive agent, which then loses its normative 
force when it turns out that he is actually not a reason-responsive agent. Thus even if someone who 
is weak-willed is not a reason-responsive agent, it does not nullify the requirement that we should 
nevertheless respect him as one. In the account of respect that I am expounding here, what it means 
to be a reason-responsive agent fleshes out the general form that this respect takes. But when it 
comes to why we should respect someone in this way, it is not because of the fact that he is a 
reason-responsive agent. Rather it is the fact that he is a human being. In other words, it is because 
he is a human being that we should respect him as a reason-responsive agent. I shall come back to 
this later in the paper. 
  
4. 
 I do think that the last argument against legal coercion is in the right direction. I agree that 
we should see individuals as reason-responsive agents in the way described; and that the problem 
with legal coercion has something to do with reason-responsive agency. However, there seems to be 
a tension within the argument as it currently stands, more specifically between reason-responsive 
agency and the claim that legal coercion somehow subverts or undermines it. The argument argues 
that legal coercion creates and appeals to prudential reasons bearing on individuals, so that they 
would deliberate to do what the law justifiably requires by responding to these prudential reasons, 
rather than the pre-legal moral or authority-based reasons that originally bear on them independent 
from the threat of punishment. However, the argument also asks us (I think rightly) to see 
individuals as reason-responsive agents who deliberate for themselves what they should do by 
appropriately responding to the reasons that bear on them. But if we are to see them in this way, 
then given the presence of these pre-legal moral or authority-based reasons and assuming that 
individuals are not ignorant of them, we would then see individuals (qua reason-responsive agents) 
as responding to these pre-legal or authority-based reasons in deliberating to do what the law 
requires. From this point of view, the prudential reasons, allegedly created and appealed to by legal 
coercion through the threat of punishment, therefore seems to be neither here nor there in the 
deliberation to do what the law requires. They are ‘epiphenomena’ so to speak. If that is the case, 
then how does legal coercion subvert or undermine reason-responsive agency, if we are to also see 
people as reason-responsive agents at the same time? 
    If I am correct about this tension, then it suggests that rather than saying legal coercion 
somehow subverts or undermines reason-responsive agency, we should say that it fails to see 
someone as a reason-responsive agent.
11
 It is in this sense that I contend legal coercion fails to 
respect people in a way that is due to them as ‘men’. 
                                                     
11
 I take this to imply that the kind of respect in question is a kind of ‘recognition respect’ (Darwall 1977: 38), i.e. 
recognizing someone as a reason-responsive agent. I nevertheless choose to use the language of ‘seeing’ here instead, 
because the language of ‘recognition’ portrays reason-responsiveness too much like a (contingent) fact about 
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  Legal coercion is a way of modifying peoples’ behavior to do what the law justifiably 
requires, by getting people to deliberate for themselves accordingly in response to the threat of 
punishment; and such threats involve, as I have explained earlier in section 2, threatening them to 
do what they already have reasons (be it pre-legal moral or authority-based), independent from the 
threat itself, to do. But if we really do see them as reason-responsive agents, then bringing their 
attention to these pre-legal moral and authority-based reasons would be more than enough to get 
them to deliberate for themselves to do what the law justifiably requires. This is because as reason-
responsive agents, they would appropriately respond to these reasons and deliberate accordingly. In 
resorting to threats, rather than these pre-legal moral and authority-based reasons, we are therefore 
not seeing the individual in question as someone who deliberates for himself accordingly by 
appropriately responding to these latter reasons. In other words, we are not seeing him as a reason-
responsive agent. 
 Of course, there is a minimal sense in which legal coercion still sees the individual in 
question as a reason-responsive agent; and that is as someone who responds narrowly to prudential 
reasons or reasons of self-interest, which the threat of punishment creates and appeals to. But as 
discussed before, a reason-responsive agent is not just narrowly responsive to only prudential and 
self-interested reasons, he is also responsive to other reasons that bear on him as well; and this 
includes the pre-legal moral and authority-based reasons that underlie what the law requires him to 
do. Thus in resorting to threats, rather than bringing these reasons to attention, legal coercion fails 
to recognize this further, but equally important, aspect of reason-responsive agency; and to that 
extent it fails to see the individual in question as a reason-responsive agent. 
 So, the argument against legal coercion here is basically this: In resorting to the threat of 
punishment, rather than the pre-legal moral or authority-based reasons that underlie what the law 
justifiably requires, legal coercion fails to see individuals as reason-responsive agents in its attempt 
to get individuals to deliberate accordingly. It is in this sense that I want to claim that legal coercion 
fails to respect them as reason-responsive agents. It also means that, at least in this context, 
adequately respecting them as reason-responsive agents involves offering and bringing their 
attention to these pre-legal moral reasons and authority-based reasons, when trying to modify their 
behavior to do what the law justifiably requires of them. I shall call this account of respect (rather 
blandly) ‘respecting people as reason-responsive agents’.12  
Note that this account of respect is intended to apply only to the kind of coercive threats that 
I have previously highlighted in legal coercion: cases where there are already reasons, 
independently from the threats, to do (or not to do) that one is threatened to do (or not to do); or 
more simply, cases where the independent reasons bearing on individuals are directed to the same 
actions as the threats themselves. The account is not intended to apply to other kinds of coercive 
threats where this is not the case. However, this does not mean that these other kinds of coercive 
threats are not morally problematic. In addition to the fact that some coercive threats might very 
well be so severe that they are incompatible with the thin ‘independence’ required for autonomous 
                                                                                                                                                                                
individuals, to which we come to recognize when respecting them accordingly. As I shall argue in the next section, we 
should avoid understanding respect in this way. 
12
 Unfortunately, what exactly this involves in relation to law, especially the criminal law, is an extensive issue that 
requires a separate discussion in its own right. By way of some suggestions, I believe this involves conceiving 
punishment in more communicative terms. It also affects how laws should be promulgated in the first place (see e.g. 
Duff 2001 & 1998 respectively). Furthermore, insofar as there are limits to law’s ability to bring people’s attention to 
the above mentioned reasons, it also suggests there is a role to be played by extra-legal institutions, like education 
and other social institutions, when it comes to respecting people as reason-responsive agents. See also the end of 
section 5. 
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agency (as discussed in section 3), other kinds of coercive threats are morally problematic for 
reasons related to, in a different way, to reason-responsive agency, or something else altogether 
depending on the case at hand. Thus in cases where the independent reasons and the threats are 
directed to opposing actions; e.g. where someone is threatened to do (or not to do) that which he 
originally and independently has reasons against (or for) doing. What is morally problematic here is 
not that the coercer is not respecting the coercee as reason-responsive agent. Rather, in issuing that 
threat, he is preventing the coercee from responding appropriately to the reasons that he originally 
and independently has. An extreme example of such a case is when one is threatened to murder 
someone at gun point. On the other hand, one might be threatened for something that one originally 
and independently does not have reasons for or against, as when one is threatened at gun point to 
hand over one’s wallet to a robber on a street.13 With regard to such cases, I tend to believe that 
what is morally problematic is that the coercive threats undermine one’s freedom, rather than for 
reasons relating to reason-responsive agency. Thus I do not subscribe to a unitary account of why 
coercive threats are, at the very least, prima facie wrongs, when they are so. Rather, I believe that 
they are wrongs for a variety of different reasons, depending on the specific case at hand.  
Indeed, it is an advantage of such a pluralistic account that it fares better in dealing with 
issues raised by conditional offers, which are very similar in structure to coercive threats. There is, 
of course, the issue of how to define coercive threats in a way that distinguishes them from 
conditional offers (Anderson 2011); but given their structural similarities, some have argued that 
certain accounts of why coercive threats are wrongful inevitably also makes all conditional offers 
wrongful for the same reasons (Sachs 2013: 72). However, under this pluralistic account, some 
conditional offers which involve offering one to do (or not to do) something that one already has 
independent reasons for (or against) - e.g. you offer a million pounds for me to refrain from murder 
- also fails to respect one as a reason-responsive agent, just like in legal coercion. Similarly, 
offering a million pounds for me to murder, just like threatening me at gun point to murder, is a 
wrong; but what is wrong here is encouraging me to not respond appropriately to reasons that I 
originally and independently have, rather than preventing me from doing so. Finally, while 
threatening one for something that one originally and independently does not have reasons for or 
against undermines one’s freedom; yet usually when one is conditionally offered it, one’s freedom 
is increased. Thus unlike its coercive counterpart, such conditional offers are not wrongs. I take it 
that paradigmatic examples of these are conditional offers in market exchanges. Of course, they 
might still be exploitative, even when they increase one’s freedoms as compared to before the offer 
was made. If that is the case, then such exploitative conditional offers are wrongs for precisely this 
reason (Lyon 1975).  
Of course, much more needs to be said to defend such a pluralistic account of the 
wrongfulness of coercive threats, but I shall have to leave it for another occasion, given that this 
paper is concerned with the kind of coercive threats in legal coercion. In any case, I hope that I have 
shown how such coercive threats in legal coercion fail to respect people as reason-responsive 
agents, and therefore we should rightly find them morally problematic; but also why although this 
would make offering a million pounds to me for refraining from murder a wrong for the same 
reason, it does not necessarily make all conditional offers wrongful, especially those found in free 
market exchanges. 
   
5. 
                                                     
13
 I take it that one does not have an independent reason against handing one’s wallet to him, which might not be the 
case if the robber is a career criminal who uses his stolen money to fund his criminal activities. 
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So far I have argued that legal coercion fails to see individuals as reason-responsive agents, 
by resorting to threats, rather than by offering to individuals the independent (pre-legal moral or 
authority-based) reasons that bear on them, when trying to modify their behavior to do what the law 
justifiably requires of them. However, I have said nothing about why individuals should be seen and 
treated in this way. In the following, I shall tentatively outline the argument for why we should 
respect people as reason-responsive agents in the sense I argued for. 
 One easy way to argue in favour of this requirement of respect is that individuals are indeed 
reason-responsive agents in the way I have described: they deliberate for themselves what they 
should (or should not) do by appropriately responding to the reasons that bear on them. Since it is 
plausible to suggest that all this is of value, we therefore should, when we try to modify individuals’ 
behavior, do it in such a way that fully recognizes it; and as the argument against legal coercion 
shows, the way to do this, at least in this context, is offer to them the independent reasons that they 
have to do what the law justifiably requires. It is by doing so that we are fully recognizing them as 
being responsive to reasons in the relevant sense. 
 However, the problem with this argument is that the empirical claim – individuals are 
indeed reason-responsive agents in the way I have described – is just blatantly false. Even putting 
aside those individuals who are so mentally disabled that they lack the requisite capacities to start 
with, the extent to which individuals respond accordingly to reasons vary significantly in real life. 
Not only can it vary from one situation to the next for any one given individual, it can also vary 
inherently from one individual to the next. Thus even if we hold constant the situation in question, 
some individuals might very well do so to the fullest extent. Respecting them as reason-responsive 
agents would then involve merely offering to them the relevant independent reasons. However, 
there are also individuals who only do so to a certain extent, or maybe to an even lesser extent when 
compared to others. For such individuals – say they are only limited to responding to prudential 
reasons, but not the relevant pre-legal moral or authority-based reasons that they have – by offering 
to them prudential reasons when we try to modify their behavior, we are indeed fully recognizing 
their responsiveness to reasons. This argument therefore implies unequal respect for individuals, 
depending on the contingent extent to which they respond to reasons accordingly. This, I take it, is 
the notorious problem of grounding equal respect to individuals on scalar properties that individuals 
have.
14
  
 I do think that respect is owed equally to individuals as reason-responsive agents, despite the 
fact that they respond to reasons accordingly in varying degrees in real life. Nevertheless, I think 
there is a grain of truth in the above argument, that there is value in being the kind of agent that is 
responsive to reasons in the way described; and that the value of human beings lies, at least partly, 
in doing so.
15
 However, the problem with the above argument is in conceiving respect in terms of 
responding to this value as it is contingently exhibited by the said individual. What I want to 
suggest, at least in this context, is a different approach to the issue of respect: rather than seeing 
respect as responding to values in individuals, we should see respect as conferring or according 
values owed to individuals. An analogy with artworks may help to illustrate the thought here. 
                                                     
14
 A recent excellent take on this problem is Carter (2011). However, while his account of ‘opacity’ respect can exclude 
legal coercion understood in terms of specific or special deterrence, it would not exclude legal coercion understood in 
terms of general deterrence. 
15
 Unfortunately a full defense of this is not possible here given the purposes and length of this paper, but see e.g. 
Nussbaum (1992: 202 & 222-223). See also n 8. Furthermore, pace the charge of anthropocentric speciesism, I do not 
claim that this makes human beings distinctively valuable or more valuable than other kinds of non-human animals. 
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 The artistic value as it is contingently exhibited by an artwork varies greatly from one 
artwork to the next (for example, compare Duchamp’s Fountain with Michelangelo’s David). Yet, 
despite this, insofar an object is an artwork, we ought to treat it as such, in a way that exhibits its 
value as an artwork. For example, we should not use the painting as a table mat or the sculpture for 
hanging clothes (or use Duchamp’s Fountain as a toilet). In doing so, we are seeing it as having the 
value of an artwork irrespective of the artistic value that it contingently exhibits, i.e. that it is not 
merely something to be used for other purposes, but something to be appreciated in itself. It is in 
this sense that we confer or accord to it the value of being an artwork, when treating it in a way that 
exhibits its value as an artwork, which we ought to in virtue of the fact that it is a piece of artwork, 
and not a table mat or clothes hanger etc. 
 Analogously, insofar as an individual is a human being, we ought to treat him as such, in a 
way that exhibits his value as a human being; and this value lies (as I have conceded earlier) at least 
partly in being a reason-responsive agent in the way described. Thus, irrespective of the contingent 
extent to which he responds to reasons accordingly, we should be offering him the independent 
(pre-legal moral or authority-based) reasons that bear on him when modifying his behavior to do 
what the law requires. This is because in doing so, we are seeing him as having this value, as 
someone who is responsive to reasons in the relevant sense, and thus are treating him in a way that 
exhibits his value as a human being. It is in this sense that respecting someone as a reason-
responsive agent, in the way I have described, confers or accords to him the value of being a human 
being, which is owed to him in virtue of the fact that he is a human being. 
 Under this understanding of respect, what grounds the requirement to respect is not the 
contingent extent to which individuals respond to reasons accordingly (which varies from one 
individual to the next, and from one situation to the next), but the fact that individuals are human 
beings. Although this fact is contingent, I do not think that it comes in degrees. Either you are a 
human being, or you are not. If one is a human being, then one cannot be a more or less human 
being. Thus a mentally disabled human being is not a lesser human being than a mentally fit human 
being. Neither is a mentally fit human being a more human being than a mentally disabled human 
being. The former might be able to exercise more of the functions that are characteristic of human 
beings than the latter. But all that means is that as human beings they have differing abilities, and 
the former happens to have more of the abilities that most other human beings have. This, however, 
does not detract from the fact that both of them are human beings. 
 Under this account, what therefore really matters when it comes to why we should respect 
individuals as reason-responsive agents is the contingent fact that they are human beings. Of course, 
it is a necessary condition to respect an individual as someone who responds to reasons accordingly, 
that he has the requisite capacities in question; just as that is also a necessary condition for being a 
reason-responsive agent. Thus for those who are so severely mentally disabled that they lack the 
said capacities, we are not required to respect them as reason-responsive agents under this account, 
even though they are in fact human beings.
16
 But insofar as this is not the case with regard to the 
individuals in question, then we are required to, according to this account, respect them as such. 
Note that what gives rise to this requirement is not that they have the requisite capacities in 
question, but the fact that they are human beings. It is because they are human beings that we are 
required to respect them as reason-responsive agents, not because they have the said capacities in 
question. Whether or not they have them functions more like, under this account, the condition 
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 This does not mean we do not owe anything towards individuals who lack the said capacities. Although respecting 
individuals as reason-responsive agents is an important moral requirement, it does not exhaust all the moral concerns 
that we owe to fellow human beings. 
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under which this requirement of respect bears on us; but what grounds this requirement, when it 
does bear on us, is the fact that the so concerned individuals are in fact human beings.  
 Although the contingent extent to which individuals respond to reasons accordingly does not 
matter when it comes to why we should respect them as reason-responsive agents, insofar as they 
have the requisite capacities in question; it does matter when it comes to the material form that 
respecting them as reason-responsive agents should take, when this requirement bears on us. Thus 
to illustrate this briefly: If the individual in question responds to reasons accordingly to the fullest 
extent, then respecting him as a reason-responsive agent might just consist in merely reminding him 
of the independent reasons he has for doing what the law requires. But if the individual in question 
only does so to a lesser extent, then it does not consist in merely reminding him of these reasons 
that he has, it also consists more substantively in: persuading and encouraging him to think more 
deeply about the reasons that he has, drawing his attention to and inviting him to consider other 
reasons that he might have, pointing out and bringing into light possible mistakes in his reasoning 
and possible ignorance on his part etc…; in short, attempting to bring him to see he has pre-legal 
moral and authority-based reasons to do what the law requires, through engaging in a dialogical 
exchange of reasons and arguments with him. All these various forms of respect duly recognize the 
significance of deliberating for oneself what one should (or should not) do by appropriately 
responding to the reasons that bear on one, in light of contingent extent to which individuals do so. 
They confer on or accord to individuals, in various ways attuned by their contingencies, the value of 
being human beings, which is owed to them in virtue of the fact that they are human beings.  
 Of course, much more work is required to substantiate what I discussed above, especially on 
conceiving respect as conferring or according values owed to individuals. But that would require a 
separate paper in its own right. Nevertheless, I hope my above discussion has shown that there can 
plausibly be an argument for why we need to respect people as reason-responsive agents in the 
sense I described, which is grounded in the value of being responsive to reasons, in a way that still 
supports equal respect among different individuals.  
 
6. 
 Before concluding this paper, I would like to address two general, but related, objections to 
the account of respect that have been discussed so far. 
  I have argued that we ought to see and recognize individuals as reason-responsive agents, 
even when they are in fact not reason-responsive in the relevant sense, as long as they have the 
requisite capacities in question. One might object that this amounts to no more than a fiction: we are 
asked to see them as reason-responsive agents, when it is not the case that they are. 
 This might very well be true, but if the argument in the last section is sound, then there are 
good reasons to see and recognize individuals as reason-responsive agents (to hold onto the fiction 
so to speak), even when they are in fact not reason-responsive in the relevant sense. This is because, 
as the above argument goes, it is by doing so that we are treating them in a way that exhibits the 
value that they have as human beings, and confers or accords to them that value, which is owed to 
them in virtue of the fact that they are human beings. The argument here has the same structure as 
the one used by moral fictionalists, who argue that even though our realist moral discourse is false, 
there are still good reasons to retain it, and continue on engaging in it as if it was true (see e.g. 
Nolan et al 2001: 308-314). Similarly, even if individuals are not in fact reason-responsive, there 
are still good reasons to see and recognize them as such; or so I try to argue. Note that I am not 
trying to defend moral fictionalism here, I am merely highlighting the kind of argument that is 
being offered. 
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 Relatedly, one might object that reason-responsive agency, which underlies the account of 
respect defended here, is just too ideal. Human beings, as Ashworth and von Hirsch persuasively 
argue, “… are moral but fallible creatures – capable of being motivated by normative appeals, but 
sometimes strongly inclined to offend nevertheless”; and thus, “we require a response that both 
takes humans’ capacity for moral judgement seriously and yet provides them with disincentives that 
can help them to control their inclinations” (2005: 23). Thus as long as legal coercion supplements 
(as opposed to replacing) the offering of the independent (pre-legal moral or authority-based) 
reasons that individuals have to do what the law requires, it is still respecting them appropriately 
(von Hirsch 1996: 42-45; but see Duff 2001: 86-88).  
To be sure, individuals would then not be respected as reason-responsive agents in the sense 
I have discussed. This is because doing so involves seeing them as someone who would 
appropriately respond to the independent reasons that they have and deliberate accordingly; and the 
above objection precisely denies this in asserting that individuals are ‘fallible’ in this respect, thus 
giving rise to the need of legal coercion as supplements. But the thought here is that it might 
nevertheless be respecting them appropriately, if we bear in mind this more ‘realistic’ understanding 
of human agency. 
I agree that human beings, as they are found in everyday life, are moral but fallible in the 
way described. But I am just not sure whether we should, just because of this, put aside a more 
‘idealized’ understanding of agency and opt for a watered down understanding, when thinking 
about the respect that is owed to individuals. It seems that doing so is like arguing that since a moral 
requirement is too ‘idealized’ and removed from what people are and will be doing, we should tone 
it down to reflect empirical realities. Of course, if what is asked of us here is just impossible (e.g. 
we are required to ensure that everyone is happy all the time), then this suggests that there is 
something wrong with the moral requirement. But here we are not asked to be reason-responsive 
agents all through our lives, which might very well be impossible. Rather, we are asked to see other 
human beings as reason-responsive agents, when we try to modify their behavior to do what the law 
requires; and that, it seems to me, is not impossible.
17
    
  Part of the objection here also turns on the element of ‘hard treatment’ in legal punishment. 
Whether this element, if it is to be justified at all, can only be justified in terms of prudential 
deterrence; or whether it can also be justified under, say for example, a communicative account of 
punishment (Ashworth & von Hirsch 2005: 21-27; Duff 2001: 82-88 & 106-115). Those who opt 
for the former would then find the objection more favourable. However, I am more optimistic to the 
possibility of the latter, though I have to leave my defense of this for another occasion; and even if 
it turns out it cannot be justified in any other ways than in terms of prudential deterrence, then so 
much the worse for ‘hard treatment’ as a justifiably element in legal punishment. 
 That said though, as I have pointed out earlier at the end of section 2: Even if ‘hard 
treatment’ as an element in legal punishment fails to respect people as reason-responsive agents, 
because it is a form of legal coercion, it is still only a prima facie wrong. Thus it might nevertheless 
be justified all things considered because of, say for example, the social security that can be 
attained by having this element in legal punishment. But even in such a case, ‘idealized’ reason-
responsive agency at least has the virtue of highlighting the moral costs that are involved for the 
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 There might also be the worry of over-demandingness here. However, when exactly a moral requirement is 
objectionably demanding is very elusive: Is the requirement to respect here, which is only a prima facie requirement 
that can be outweighed by other considerations in different circumstances (see text below and also the end of section 
2), objectionably demanding? For more on the over-demandingness objection as it is used in moral philosophy, see 
e.g. Sobel (2007).    
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sake of social security. Costs that we should confront and face up to, even when they are justified,
18
 
but which would have been hidden and masked by a watered down understanding of agency. 
     
7. 
 This paper has tried to demonstrate that legal coercion fails to respect people as reason-
responsive agents. Respecting people as reason-responsive agents involves, at least within the 
context that concerns this paper, offering to them or bringing their attention to the pre-legal moral 
or authority-based reason that they have, independent from the threat of punishment, to do (or not to 
do) what the law justifiably requires (or prohibits). It is by doing so that we are fully recognizing 
and seeing them as reason-responsive agents. Legal coercion is therefore morally problematic 
precisely because it does not involve this, and to that extent it fails to see people as reason-
responsive agents and therefore fail to respect them as such. We are required to respect people in 
this way, I have argued, because by doing so we confer or accord to them the value of being human 
beings, which is owed to them in virtue of the fact that they are human beings. Thus accordingly, by 
failing to respect people as reason-responsive agents, legal coercion fails to treat them with the 
‘respect that is due to them as men’.  
 Although I refer to this account of respect in terms of ‘reason-responsive agency’, I do not 
intend it to compete with accounts that are based on autonomous agency. Indeed, throughout this 
paper, I have situated my arguments as a way of fleshing out the kind of ‘independence’ that is 
required for autonomous agency; but without committing myself necessarily to a specific 
understanding of autonomous agency, by offering independent arguments for my account at various 
places. The hope is that irrespective of the debate on how best to understand autonomous agency, 
and the respect required for it, we can still develop, argue for and defend a kind of respect that is 
captured by the Hegelian objection to legal coercion. Whether or not the kind of respect expounded 
in this paper is part and parcel of the respect to autonomous agency remains, for my purposes, an 
open question. 
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